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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 176

SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Propaganda Objectives and Tactics Relating to the CFM

To achieve its objectives at the current CFM meeting, it is estimated that the USSR will utilize the following strategy, tactics, and themes in the field of propaganda.

Strategy:

1. Volume and emphasis of the propaganda output will be regulated according to intended audience, i.e. whether it is aimed at (a) the Western audience, (b) the German audience, (c) the Soviet home audience.

2. The strategy will call for the exploitation of themes susceptible to adaptation to any eventual outcome of the CFM meeting. With characteristic flexibility, Soviet propaganda will be prepared, according to the directions the negotiations take, to:

a. Denounce a deadlock (to all audiences) as proof of Western obstructionism, militarism and plans for aggression, lack of a sincere desire for peace, and (particularly to the German audience) intentions to divide Germany permanently and utilize its lands, resources, and people for hostile moves against the USSR.

b. To interpret Soviet concessions or a radical revision of Soviet proposals (to the Western and German audiences) as tangible evidence of the USSR's great love of peace, of its reasonableness and desire to shun obstructionism, and (to the Soviet home audience) as an indication of the USSR's world leadership, a triumph of Soviet diplomacy, and a counterblow to the warmongering machinations of Western delegations.

Tactics:

Propaganda tactics in general will be varied in accordance with the audience for which it is intended.

1. Moscow's themes for Western countries will be directed to the end of trying to bring pressure on the CFM delegations to find some basis for agreement, whatever degree of acceptance of Soviet demands this involves. No means of discrediting the delegations in the eyes of their peoples will be neglected if the meeting appears to be going against Soviet desires.

Note: This report has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

MAY 24 1949
AD-20



Efforts to drive a wedge between different Western Powers will be intensified, particularly between the French on one hand and the US-UK on the other. Soviet propaganda will reflect solicitude for Franco-Soviet friendly relations.

2. Output directed to Germany will concentrate on convincing the Germans that only the USSR is holding out for a realization of goals which the Germans generally wish.

3. Tactics affecting the Soviet home audience will be primarily concerned with maintaining Soviet prestige and freedom of initiative in the CFM meeting and countering any propaganda even remotely capable of reaching a Soviet audience which might question Soviet motives or picture Soviet aims in a light differing from the official version.

Themes and Sub-Themes:

Moscow can be expected to shift its emphasis on various themes and sub-themes to serve its pressure needs during the progress of the CFM negotiations. An estimate of the themes to be employed places these themes in a priority position:

1. USSR's struggle for peace: a heavy play to all audiences exploiting these sub-themes:

a. Only the USSR adheres faithfully to the Potsdam-Yalta principles.

b. USSR's solitary stand for peace in the UN shows it will represent cause of peace at the CFM.

c. The peace-loving masses of the world demand that the CFM support the USSR's peace proposals.

d. The USSR supports withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany which proves its peaceful intentions. (Note: This theme is beamed to German and Western audiences. It is not yet exploited in the USSR.)

e. The German people's desire for peace and a unified nation has been expressed, particularly in the Volkskongress election. The USSR shows by its position that it wishes to conform to this popular will. (Note: For German and Western dissemination.)

2. Western militarism and plans for aggression: some shifts of emphasis on the following sub-themes of this subject are probable to heighten the appeal to the different audiences.

a. Inclusion of a German state in the North Atlantic Pact would be an aggressive move aimed at the USSR and People's Democracies.

b. A refusal to admit the USSR and its Satellites to the Ruhr control authority would be "proof" that three-power control of the Ruhr and its industrial development are a preparation for aggressive war against the USSR.

c. Failure to agree on a united Germany and Western establishment of a west German state would be inspired by the desire to employ Germany as a war base against the USSR.

d. The Western Powers are blocking an Austrian peace treaty in order to justify their maintenance of occupation troops as a part of the strategic plan of the North Atlantic Pact. (Note: Soviet propaganda on the London CFM meeting was silent concerning the Austrian peace treaty.)

e. The Western Powers are attempting to dictate CFM decisions but the USSR will not be coerced.